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Abstract
In 2017, the UK Parliament passed an Act requiring
legal pornographic websites to implement ‘robust’
age verification checks. Although the Act inspired
lawmakers elsewhere to propose similar legislation, it
was never enacted, in part because it did not cover
social media platforms. Instead, the UK government
has turned to its Online Harms White Paper—which
does target social media platforms—to protect chil-
dren from online pornography. There is, however,
scant evidence on the media platforms and technol-
ogies children use to access pornography. To fill this
knowledge gap, we conducted a survey of 16‐ and
17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom. The results
show that more (63%) had seen pornography on
social media platforms than on pornographic web-
sites (47%), suggesting the UK government was right
to target such platforms in its latest proposals. How-
ever, pornography was much more frequently viewed
on pornographic websites than on social media,
showing how important the regulation of such sites
remains. Furthermore, our finding that 46% of 16‐
and 17‐year‐olds had used a virtual private network
or Tor browser adds weight to concerns that restric-
tions on legal internet pornography—such as age
verification checks—imposed by a single country
may be circumvented by those the restrictions are
designed to protect.
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INTRODUCTION
The moral panic over ‘cyberporn’ may not have begun with Time magazine's eponymous
1995 cover story, but Philip Elmer‐Dewitt's infamous article certainly amplified the anxiety.
Drawing on a controversial piece of research, his feature claimed that ‘trading in sexually
explicit imagery … is now one of the largest … recreational applications of … computer
networks’ (Elmer‐Dewitt, 1995). Whatever that claim's contemporaneous veracity, some of
the issues raised in the article remain relevant more than two decades later, including: How
online pornography can ‘fall into the hands of’ children and adolescents; lawmakers'
‘obligation to preserve essential civil liberties’; and the difficulties of censoring global,
decentralised communications networks (ibid.).
Elmer‐Dewitt's article was published at a time when governments were starting to take
positions on these issues. In some countries with weak or poorly upheld civil liberties,
decisions were being taken to proscribe online pornography altogether. In the same year as
the Time cover story, for instance, the People's Republic of China announced such a ban
(Associated Press, 1995). Two years later, when Vietnam allowed its residents to access the
internet, it did so with filters that blocked pornography (AFP, 1997). Similar prohibitions are
still in place in a number of countries—such as the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and
Pakistan (Freedom House, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c).
Most democratic countries have not tried to completely prohibit online pornography, but
have tended to restrict only certain forms such as ‘child’ and ‘extreme’ pornography
(Nair, 2019). Although some of their politicians have attempted to bring in wider bans on
legal, adult pornography, those efforts have largely been frustrated by free speech rights
(see, e.g., Carlin, 1996) and by the global nature of the internet, which makes it challenging
to enforce national legislation on providers of pornography located outside a country's jur-
isdiction. Publishers of pornography tend to be based in territories that do not impede their
operations.
The 1995 Time magazine cover story said ‘some fairly daunting’ computer skills were
required to download and view pornographic images from the internet (Elmer‐Dewitt, 1995).
Such skills are clearly no longer necessary. In 2009, the president of the British Board of
Film Classification (BBFC) talked about how a ‘vast catalogue of explicit pornographic
videos’ was available instantly, and for free, via popular “YouTube‐style” websites’
(Wake, 2009). One such site, Pornhub, which was launched in 2007, is now, by one
measure, the 27th most popular website in the world (Alexa, 2019).
The popularity of such so‐called ‘porn‐tube’ sites may be a reason why governments in
some democracies have started to look again at their laws. In 2013, the Icelandic govern-
ment proposed ‘creating a national internet filter and a blacklist of websites that contain
pornographic content’. That plan, however, never reached the statute book (Freedom
House, 2017). Not so the United Kingdom's Digital Economy Bill, which passed into law in
2017. The Digital Economy Act, as it became, meant that the United Kingdom became one
of the first democracies in the world to pass legislation that, if enacted, would limit access to
legal online pornography by its residents. Part 3 of the Act required providers of online
commercial pornography accessible from the United Kingdom to deploy robust age ver-
ification controls to ensure that those accessing explicit material were at least 18‐years old.
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The law targeted pornographic sites based outside the United Kingdom. Sites based in the
United Kingdom were already subject to such regulations but had next to no market share
(Chorley, 2014). The body that was initially appointed to enforce the legislation would have
had the power to instruct internet service providers in the United Kingdom to block sites that
did not comply (BBFC, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, https://www.ageverificationregulator.
com/faq#10), as well as take other measures.
The United Kingdom's age verification legislation prompted governments in Ireland,
Australia, New Zealand, and Poland to consider similar measures (Finn, 2019; Radio New
Zealand, 2018; Taylor, 2020; Yagielowicz, 2019). France passed a similar law in July 2020
(Braun & Kayali, 2020) and a private member's bill that aims to restrict ‘young persons’
online access to sexually explicit material’ received its first reading in the Canadian Senate
in September 2020 (Parliament of Canada, 2020). In Germany, authorities are attempting to
force internet service providers to block legal pornographic websites that do not implement
age verification controls (Geiger, 2020). However, Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act has not
been enacted by the UK government and looks unlikely to be, in part because it did not
cover social media platforms, a potential source of pornographic content. Instead, the UK
government has tabled an alternative, wider set of proposals aimed at ‘tech companies’ that
allow ‘users to share or discover user‐generated content or interact with each other online’.
The proposals aim to reduce ‘online harms’—such as children's exposure to adult
pornography—through a ‘range of tools’ (Gov.uk, 2020), including, but not limited to, age
verification technologies. There are important differences between sexually explicit content
that is user‐generated and commercial pornography, and the transition in regulatory at-
tention from a focus on commercial porn to ‘harmful’ user‐generated content will be ad-
dressed further later in this article.
In light of the policies being formulated by elected governments to regulate legal internet
pornography, this study seeks to add to the evidence from which such policies can draw and
provide a baseline for future longitudinal research on the effects of any legislation that is
enacted in the United Kingdom. We do this by conducting and analysing a survey of 16‐ and
17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom (N = 1,001). Specifically, we analyse the proportions of
16‐ and 17‐year‐olds who have been exposed to online (and offline) pornography, the
frequency and duration of any such consumption, and any sociodemographic variations. As
we have mentioned, the United Kingdom's original age verification legislation only targeted
dedicated pornographic websites. Social media platforms, search engines, and video‐
sharing sites such as YouTube were exempt. The UK government's subsequent proposals
do, however, target these other platforms. In light of this change, our analysis also looks at
which platforms 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom use to access pornography.
Questions have been raised about the effectiveness of age verification controls on online
pornography because, some say, users could easily bypass such controls using technolo-
gies such as VPNs (virtual private networks) and Tor browsers (see, e.g., Matthews‐
King, 2018). Consequently, we also analyse the extent to which 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the
United Kingdom are aware of and use these technologies.
Our results show that, overall, 80.5% of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom said
they had seen ‘sexually explicit porn videos or pictures’. Among this large majority, their last
exposure was, on average, 5.5 days previously. It was most common, however, for those
16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom who had seen sexually explicit videos or pic-
tures to have seen them on the day they completed the survey (see Table 1 and Figure 1).
A higher proportion of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom have been exposed to
sexually explicit videos or pictures on social media (63%) and search engines (51%) than on
dedicated pornographic websites (47%). However, pornographic material is much more
frequently viewed on dedicated pornographic websites than on social media, search en-
gines, or YouTube (see Table 1 and Figure 1).
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Regression analysis showed significant differences in the consumption of pornography
by males and females and by respondents from households of different social grades.
Finally, our results also showed that 46% of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds had used a VPN or Tor
browser and another 23% knew what they were.
TABLE 1 Reach of, and recency of exposure to, sexually explicit porn videos or pictures via eight media
platforms among 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom, June 2019
Media platform
% who've seen sexually
explicit porn videos or
pictures on media
platform(s)
Days since last exposure to
sexually explicit porn videos
or pictures on media
platform(s)
Mean Median
Online porn websites that only show sexually
explicit content
47 13 1
Social media (like Instagram, Twitter, or Reddit) 63 60 20
Internet search engines (like Google) 51 58 20
TV or DVDs 38 56 20
Images or videos that someone downloaded
or sent to you (e.g., via WhatsApp
or Snapchat)
39 119 30
YouTube 24 170 45
E‐mail 6 44 20
Magazines 22 277 95
Any of the eight media platforms above 81 6 0
Any of the five online platformsa 78 6 0
aOnline porn websites that only show sexually explicit content; social media (like Instagram, Twitter, or Reddit); internet search








































Email (6%) TV/DVD (38%)
F IGURE 1 Reach of—and recency of exposure to—pornography via each of eight media platforms among
16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the UK (N = 1,001). The size of the bubbles indicates the proportion who have had any
exposure. The position of the bubbles indicates the mean and median days since last exposure
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The study has important implications for legislators considering the regulation of legal
internet pornography. First, it shows that a large majority of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the
United Kingdom are exposed to online pornography and that the exposure is relatively
frequent. Second, it shows the targets of the United Kingdom's original age verification
legislation—dedicated pornographic websites—are the most frequent source of internet
pornography for 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom, with those who use them doing
so for an average of 2 h 18min a month. However, other sources, such as social media
platforms, are also important, suggesting that the UK government was right to include such
platforms in its latest proposals to reduce children's exposure to legal online pornography.
Third, the level of knowledge about, and use of, VPNs and Tor browsers by those under 18
in the United Kingdom adds weight to concerns that restrictions on the access to legal online
pornography imposed by a single country may be circumvented by those the checks are
designed to protect.
In the Literature Review, we will provide a brief history of the United Kingdom's age
verification legislation and its likely successor and review some of the previous research on
children and adolescents' exposure to online pornography, including such data as exists
about the platforms through which they are exposed. A description of the methods used in
our survey comes next, followed by the Results and Discussion.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The United Kingdom's age verification legislation and its likely
successor
The Digital Economy Act of 2017 stated that legal online commercial pornography acces-
sible from the United Kingdom must deploy age verification controls to prevent children from
accessing explicit material. UK pornographic sites were already required to deploy age
verification, but most pornographic sites visited by UK users are located outside the United
Kingdom (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport [DCMS], 2017, p. 4) and it is
these sites that the Act targeted. The BBFC, the body that deals with age regulation for films
and videos, was tasked with oversight. The stated intention was to apply the same age
regulation that applies to legal offline pornography to legal online pornography (BBFC, ‘Age‐
Verification under the Digital Economy Act 2017’, https://www.ageverificationregulator.
com/).
The Act was introduced by the Conservative government in line with a 2015 manifesto
commitment (Gayle, 2018; Children's Media Foundation, 2020). The age verification mea-
sures were to be found in Part 3 of the Act, which also prohibited the availability of extreme
pornographic content online (BBFC, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, https://www.
ageverificationregulator.com/faq/#1).
If implemented, the age verification regulation would have required people wishing to
access legal commercial online pornography to prove they are over 18. According to the
BBFC, the system would not have involved personal identification of the user (BBFC, ‘Age‐
Verification under the Digital Economy Act 2017’, https://www.ageverificationregulator.com/).
There would have been several age verification options, ‘normally’ provided by third parties
so that users would not have had to share personal information directly with pornographic
websites. This might have involved buying a card in a shop or using ID documents online.
The BBFC stated that its main focus would be on ‘commercial pornographic sites with high
volumes of traffic’. It would carry out ‘spot checks on less‐visited sites’ and also provide a
means for individuals to report noncompliers (BBFC, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, https://
www.ageverificationregulator.com/faq/#1).
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Critics pointed out that the measures left some legal online pornography unpoliced. They
did not cover ‘websites on which less than a third of the content is pornographic material and
where it is provided free of charge’, which meant that ‘blogging, social media and image‐
sharing services such as Imgur, Tumblr, Twitter and Reddit, which host vast quantities of
pornographic content’, would ‘continue to be accessible without any age checks’
(Gayle, 2018). Search engines too fell outside the regulations (BBFC, ‘Frequently Asked
Questions’, https://www.ageverificationregulator.com/faq/#1).
The BBFC could have requested social media and search engines to withdraw their
services from non‐compliers (BBFC, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, https://www.
ageverificationregulator.com/faq/#1), but they would not have been obliged to do so. The
same was true for payment service providers (DCMS, 2017). The BBFC would, however,
have had the power to instruct internet service providers to block noncompliant porno-
graphic services (DCMS, 2017).
Concerns were also voiced about users being pushed towards the dark web. The Open
Rights Group talked of users being forced ‘underground’ and resorting to the use of masked
means of browsing such as Tor, which anonymises usage and makes available extreme and
illegal material (Wheeler, 2018).
Some critics described the regulations as ‘largely unworkable’, with the restrictions easily
sidestepped by the use of ‘a virtual private network or other software’ that allows access to
sites ‘via an unrestricted country’ (Matthews‐King, 2018). It was claimed that though the
scheme might help to prevent children stumbling on inappropriate sites, it would provide little
impediment to ‘determined teenagers’ (Kelion, 2017). The government impact report ac-
knowledged the possible use of VPNs and peer‐to‐peer sharing as a means of bypassing
restrictions, however, the Age Verification Providers Association denied that restrictions
could be ‘easily circumvented’, claiming that adult sites can block VPNs if they want, ‘just as
Netflix and the BBC iPlayer already do’ (Children's Media Foundation, 2020).
The legislation was subject to delays. In March 2018, the government stated that it
needed more time to ‘get it right’ (Kleinman, 2018), and in June 2019, it announced another
delay, ‘in the region of 6 months’, because it had failed to inform the European Union of the
proposals as required by European law (Waterson & Hern, 2019).
In October 2019, the UK government announced that it would ‘not be commencing Part 3
of the Digital Economy Act 2017 concerning age verification for online pornography’
(Morgan, 2019). It stated that this was not due to any lessening of its desire to protect
children from accessing inappropriate, harmful content, which it still believed was ‘vital’
(ibid.). Rather, it appeared to have had concerns that the age verification regulations that
formed part of the Digital Economy Act were not ‘coherent’ and ‘comprehensive’, in part
because they did ‘not cover social media platforms’ (ibid.). Others suggested privacy con-
cerns may have played a part in the decision, with the companies developing the age
verification procedures subject only to ‘voluntary’ privacy commitments and user details
vulnerable, it was said, to a data breach (BBC News, 2020).
As an alternative, the government proposed that its ‘objective of protecting children from
online pornography’ (Gov.uk, 2020) could be achieved through proposals developed as part of
its Online Harms White Paper (HM Government, 2019), which it had published in April 2019.
This Paper was wider in scope than the abandoned regulations. It placed a ‘duty of care on
companies to improve online safety’ (Morgan, 2019), with the ‘harms’ listed in the Paper
including terrorist propaganda, cyberbullying and assisting suicide, in addition to ‘underage
exposure to legal content’, which included ‘children accessing pornography’ (HM Government,
2019, p. 31). The government proposed that the regulatory framework should apply to
‘companies that allow users to share or discover user‐generated content or interact with each
other online’ and named ‘social media platforms, file‐hosting sites, public discussion forums,
messaging services and search engines’ as examples of such companies (p. 8).
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In its response to the feedback it received on the Paper, the government said it would
‘expect companies to use a proportionate range of tools, including age assurance and age
verification technologies to prevent children from accessing age‐inappropriate or harmful
content’ (Gov.uk, 2020). The Office of Communications (Ofcom), which regulates commu-
nications services including television and radio (Ofcom, ‘What Is Ofcom?’, https://www.
ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/what-is-ofcom), is likely to be the regulator of any Online Harms
Act (Gov.uk, 2020) and may have ‘powers to issue substantial fines and to impose liability on
individual members of senior management’ (HM Government, 2019, p. 7) for noncompliance.
Research into adolescents’ use of pornography, including online
Prevalence and predictors
Peter and Valkenburg's (2016) review of 20 years of research about adolescents and por-
nography provides a comprehensive summary of the literature that was published between
1995 and 2015. The authors reviewed 75 studies and one of their goals—to ‘revisit the
question of the prevalence and predictors of adolescents’ use of pornography’—is relevant
to this study. They found that ‘findings about the prevalence of adolescents' use of porno-
graphy differ greatly’. The authors concluded that, although the studies ‘suggest that at least
a sizable minority of all adolescents use pornography’, ‘exact aggregate figures about
adolescents' pornography use seem difficult to derive from the literature’.
They provide three reasons for this ‘diversity of findings’. First, that the studies have
varied methodologically, ‘notably in terms of sampling method, sample size, sample com-
position, survey mode/administration, and operationalization of pornography use’. Second,
that in the period under review the ‘Internet has undergone dramatic changes—and with it
adolescents' access to Internet pornography’. Third, ‘the cultural context (e.g., sex educa-
tion, sexual liberalism) of studies is likely to affect how often adolescents (report to) use
pornography’. Kohut et al. (2020) agree that there is little by way of a global consensus
regarding the proportion of people who use pornography and the intensity of that use. They
too point to differences in sample composition between studies and how those studies
conceptualised and measured pornography use.
Although Peter and Valkenburg (2016) make clear that generalisations are not possible
about the prevalence of adolescents' use of pornography, they do make a tentative gen-
eralisation about the predictors of such use, specifically that ‘the most likely users of por-
nography are male, pubertally more advanced, sensation‐seeking adolescents with weak or
troubled family relations’. This conclusion was supported by Alexandraki et al.'s (2018)
systematic review of research on adolescent pornography use, which included research
published up to 1 May 2017.
Research about young people and pornography published since 2017, and therefore, not
part of Peter and Valkenburg's (2016) or Alexandraki et al.'s (2018) reviews, has continued
to focus on a variety of cultural contexts, to utilise differently sized and composed samples,
and to define pornography in a variety of ways. It is no surprise then that these studies differ
in the proportions of young people they find to have been exposed to pornography. For
example, Wright et al. (2020) found that 68% of the US sample of the 14‐ to 18‐year‐olds
they surveyed had viewed pornography (defined as ‘sexually explicit pictures, videos, or
livestreams’), whereas, in Hong Kong, Ma et al. (2017) found that only 2%–6% of their 11‐ to
16‐year‐old sample had intentionally viewed pornography and 4%–14% had come across it
unintentionally.
There has been a limited amount of research on the exposure to pornography by children
and adolescents in the United Kingdom. Horvath et al. (2013) identified fewer than 10
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studies published between 1983 and 2013 that contained ‘“new” empirical evidence’. In-
deed, Nash et al. (2015, p. 5) were, in 2015, unable ‘to find any recent UK studies which
provide clear figures for online and offline viewing of pornography for all children up to the
age of 18’. Since 2015, there has, however, been one study that does provide some clear
figures. An online survey commissioned by BBFC and conducted in 2019 with a
representative sample (N = 1,142) of children and adolescents in the United Kingdom found
that 51% of 11‐ to 13‐year‐olds, 66% of 14‐ and 15‐year‐olds, and 79% of 16‐ and 17–year‐
olds had seen pornography at some point (BBFC, 2020, p. 15). Other than for age, the study
did not report on any potential predictors of pornography use found within the survey data,
for example gender or socioeconomic classification.
Intensity of consumption
In addition to whether or not children and adolescents have been exposed to pornography,
the intensity of any consumption—in terms of both frequency and time spent—is clearly of
interest, given that there is some evidence that frequent use is associated with problem
behaviours (Svedin et al., 2011), including internet pornography addiction (Harper &
Hodgins, 2016).
In their review of 276 studies on pornography and children/adolescents published up to
2013, Horvath et al. (2013, p. 22) note discrepancies ‘with regard to the regularity of exposure’,
with some research suggesting that exposure is infrequent and other studies reporting greater
frequency. This contradictory evidence, the authors write, ‘highlights the importance of
considering frequency as well as prevalence to obtain a full picture’. According to the authors,
‘few studies have considered the length of time spent viewing pornography’ (p. 22).
In the context of the United Kingdom, the only quantitative data on the frequency with
which pornography was consumed that was reported in the aforementioned BBFC survey
related to whether exposure had been ‘in the last 2 weeks’ or earlier. Of those who had seen
pornography, between 18% (of 11‐ to 13‐year‐olds) and 41% (of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds) had
seen it in the last 2 weeks (BBFC, 2020, p. 15). The BBFC study also conducted 36
qualitative interviews with 16‐ to 18‐year‐olds. ‘Most’ of the 20 boys interviewed ‘reported
having watched pornography daily for a period of their lives’, while the amount of porno-
graphy watched by the 16 girls varied: ‘Some… reported watching pornography four times a
week between the ages of 14 and 16, whereas others said they watched it a few times a
month’ (BBFC, 2020, p. 20).
Although the BBFC study did not report the amount of time children and adolescents
spent viewing pornography, there are some recent figures from New Zealand, courtesy of a
nationally representative survey (N = 2,071) carried out by the Office of Film and Literature
Classification (OFLC)—New Zealand's equivalent of the BBFC—with 14‐ to 17‐year‐olds.
The results show that most (71%) of 14‐ to 17‐year‐olds in New Zealand who had seen
pornography in the last 6 months spent either ‘a few minutes’ or ‘up to half an hour’ looking
at porn each time they saw it (OFLC, 2018, p. 24).
Platforms
Beyond the prevalence and intensity of pornography use among adolescents, this study is
also interested in how—that is, through which media platforms—that exposure takes place.
Having such data will allow us to evaluate the UK government's decision to expand its plans
for the regulation of legal internet pornography to include material available on platforms
other than dedicated pornographic websites, such as social media networks.
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The literature on children and adolescents' use of pornography rarely pays much at-
tention to the platforms through which that use takes place. This is understandable given
that the foci of many of the previous studies—on, for example, sexual behaviour
(Doornwaard et al., 2015), academic performance (Beyens et al., 2015), and sexting (Van
Ouytsel et al., 2014)—were not expected to be influenced by the particular platforms through
which pornography was accessed but rather the level of exposure to pornography in
general.
Though some studies have collected data on the particular platforms used by young
people to access pornography, that data is not always reported (see, e.g., Hardy
et al., 2013). Where the data is reported, the platforms listed may overlap (see, e.g., Ma
et al., 2017). As a result, it is, as Nash et al. (2015, p. 6) write, ‘surprisingly complicated to
determine whether pornographic content is viewed by children “online” or “offline.”’
Such literature that does exist demonstrates, unsurprisingly, that ‘the most common
ways in which children and young people access pornography have changed in recent
years, from magazines, videos, television and books … to the internet playing a more
dominant role’ (Horvath et al., 2013, p. 24). This said, at least up to 2013, the use of ‘DVDs,
films, magazines and television’ as a source was apparently ‘still widespread’ (ibid.). In the
UK context, data from 2010 also showed that traditional mass media may have had a
significant role—at that time—in children's exposure to pornography (Nash et al., 2015).
The above‐mentioned BBFC study is, as of June 2020, the most recent to provide, in the
context of the United Kingdom, some data on the particular online platforms through which
young people consume pornography. The survey found that for children aged 11–17 (as well
as for 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds) ‘image or video search engines’ were the most commonly used
source to intentionally seek out pornography, followed by social media sites and dedicated
pornography websites. Among 16‐ to 17‐year‐olds, 62% had intentionally sought out por-
nography via an image or video search engine, 46% via social media sites, and 44% via
dedicated pornography websites (BBFC, 2020, p. 26). Among the—albeit small and
unrepresentative—group of three dozen 16‐ to 18‐year‐olds who were interviewed for the
study, ‘dedicated pornography sites such as Pornhub and xHamster were the most popular
source of pornography’, although ‘it was also very common for respondents to have seen
pornography through social media’, with the most common platforms being Snapchat,
Instagram and Twitter (BBFC, 2020, p. 23).
The aforementioned OFLC study also provides recent data on the particular platforms
through which pornography is accessed by 14‐ to 17‐year‐olds in New Zealand. The survey
found that, of those who had seen pornography in the last 6 months, mobile/smart phones
were the main source for 56% and computers, tablets, TVs, or other digital devices for 37%.
Magazines or books were the main source for only 2% of respondents (OFLC, 2018, p. 28).
In terms of how online pornography was accessed, ‘porn websites’ were the most common
source (for 66%), followed by ‘Google or another online search service’ (28%), ‘other
websites’ (25%) and ‘social media and other online services or apps’ (16%) (OFLC,
2018, p. 28).
It is notable that social media sites and search engines appear to be less frequent
sources of pornography in New Zealand than in the United Kingdom, although this may be to
do with the differences in the surveys’ samples and methodologies.
Workaround technology
As has been mentioned, the United Kingdom's original age verification legislation was cri-
ticised by some on the grounds that users would easily be able to bypass such controls,
using technologies such as VPNs and Tor browsers (see, e.g., Matthews‐King, 2018).
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The only data we could find on the use of VPNs or Tor browsers by children was in the
aforementioned BBFC study, which found that 23% of children aged 11–17 reported
‘knowing how to use a potential “workaround” (i.e. a VPN… the use of Tor)’ that could
circumvent age verification, and this knowledge increased with age (to 33% of 16‐ to
17‐year‐olds) (BBFC, 2020, p. 56).
Hypotheses and research questions
Although this study will not engage in specific hypothesis testing, the literature suggests that
‘at least a sizable minority’ (Peter & Valkenburg, 2016) of UK adolescents will use porno-
graphy. Indeed, given that the United Kingdom is—compared with some other countries—
relatively sexually liberal and that pornography is now easily available via the internet, the
BBFC's (2020) finding that a large majority (79%) of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United
Kingdom have seen pornography at some point seems plausible. In line with other research
(see Peter & Valkenburg, 2016 and Alexandraki et al., 2018 for a summary), we would
expect a higher level of consumption by males and also, perhaps, differences according to
familial background. Recent data on the intensity with which pornography is consumed by
young people in the United Kingdom is mostly anecdotal, but it does indicate regular con-
sumption, especially by boys (BBFC, 2020, p. 20).
Little research exists on how—that is, through which media platforms—children and
adolescents are exposed to pornography. However, printed books and magazines look likely
to be a less frequent source than computers and, especially, smartphones (OFLC, 2018,
p. 28). In the online environment, dedicated pornographic websites, social media sites, and
search engines are likely to be sources of pornography (BBFC, 2020; OFLC, 2018), al-
though the relative importance of these platforms as a source of online pornography is not
clear from the literature. The extent to which children and adolescents are aware of—and
use—technologies, such as VPNs and Tor browsers, that can be used to circumvent at-
tempts to limit access to online pornography in particular jurisdictions is unclear, although
one UK study indicated that a third of 16‐ to 17‐year‐olds may know how to use such
technology (BBFC, 2020, p. 56).
Our first research question seeks to establish the prevalence and recency of porno-
graphy use among 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom:
RQ1: What proportion of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom have seen sexually
explicit videos or pictures via any of eight named media platforms and how recent
was any such exposure?
Our second research question examines how—that is, through which media platforms—
UK 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds are exposed to pornography:
RQ2: Which media platforms do 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom use to view
pornographic videos or pictures and how recent is the use of each platform for this
purpose?
For one particular platform, the subject of the original UK age verification legislation, we
also ask:
RQ3: How much time do 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom spend visiting
dedicated pornographic websites per month and how is that time split between
personal computers (PCs) and mobile devices (smartphones and tablets)?
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To better understand knowledge about, and use of, technology that could be used to
circumvent any national limits on the access to online pornography, our final research
question asks:
RQ4: What proportions of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom are aware of, or
have used, a VPN or Tor browser?
Although the primary focus of our study was not on differences between individuals, for
each of the above research questions we also analysed whether there were any differences
according to respondents' age, gender, parental social grade, and their knowledge about/use
of VPNs/Tor browsers. We did this for three reasons. First, in order that our results could
contribute to what is known, in general terms (see, e.g., Peter & Valkenburg, 2016;
Alexandraki et al., 2018), about the individual differences in pornography use among ado-
lescents (specifically 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds). Second, because very little, if anything, is known
about individual differences in contemporary pornography use among adolescents (specifi-
cally 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds) in the UK context. Third, because one of the individual differences
(knowledge about/use of VPNs/Tor browsers) speaks directly to one of the primary aims of
this study—the evaluation of the potential efficacy of emerging legislative approaches.
It was decided to restrict the survey to 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds, in part because it was not
possible, for ethical reasons, to question children below the age of 16 on this topic without a
parent or guardian being present. The presence of a parent or guardian would likely have
influenced the answers they gave, for reasons of social desirability.
METHOD
Survey instrument and procedure
The survey consisted of five questions (see online Supporting Information Material). The
survey was fielded in June 2019 using YouthSight's online research panel that had, at
the time, approximately 140,000 UK‐based panellists aged 16–30. YouthSight's panellists
are recruited via a variety of channels including social media, partnerships with ‘reliable,
niche organisations’ (YouthSight, 2018) and websites—including their own online commu-
nity, OpinionPanel. Their recruitment process is compliant with the Market Research
Society's (MRS) Code of Conduct and Binding Guidelines (ibid.). Panellists are paid up to £4
for each survey they take. As with most online research panels, YouthSight does not verify
the identity of its panellists face‐to‐face. However, a variety of steps are taken to check the
veracity of the demographic data YouthSight hold. For example, the self‐reported ages of
panellists are regularly checked by evaluating whether they are responding as expected for
someone of their age. The self‐reported locations of panellists are also regularly checked,
including by comparing the region from which panellists are completing a survey against
their self‐reported location (Hayley Adonis, Head of Project Management, YouthSight,
personal communication, 15 February 2021).
YouthSight is accredited by MRS.1 The research was carried out in line with the gui-
dance contained within MRS's Guidelines for Research with Children and Young People
(MRS, 2014), including gathering informed consent, offering respondents the opportunity to
stop the survey at any time, and giving a ‘prefer not to say’ option with each question. Indeed
the MRS was specifically consulted about the ethical aspects of the survey instrument and
approved its fielding.
The selection of panellists for the survey aimed to achieve a final sample that matched the
spread of genders and parental social grades found among the population of 16‐ and
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17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom. Parental social grade is ‘an occupation‐based measure of
socioeconomic status’ (Ally et al., 2016) that is widely used in the United Kingdom. An initial
set of survey invitations were sent to eligible panellists and survey completions monitored to
see how the gender and social grade quotas were being filled. Subsequent survey invitations
were more targeted in an attempt to meet the required quotas (Hayley Adonis, Head of Project
Management, YouthSight, personal communication, 15 February 2021). Because the required
quotas were not met exactly (see Table S1), the responses were weighted by gender2 and
parental social grade3 so that the results would be more representative of the wider population
of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom. No weighting was applied regarding age, but,
as is shown in the results section, no significant differences were found between 16‐ and 17‐
year‐olds regarding whether, when, and how they had been exposed to sexually explicit
videos and pictures. After data cleaning, the final sample contained 1,001 responses.
Because of the different types of measures used (e.g., ever seen pornography, number
of days since last exposure to pornography and time spent using pornography) and their
different measurement scales (binary and count), it was necessary to vary our analysis
methods. For example, we used logistic regression for the binary variable and over-
dispersed Poisson regression (Gardner et al., 1995) and linear regression for the count
variables. All our statistical analyses are based on generalised linear models (McCullagh &
Nelder, 1989). The data were analysed in R (R Core Team, 2018). In the results section, β is
the coefficient of either the logistic, linear, or overdispersed Poisson regression.
RESULTS
RQ1: What proportion of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom have seen sexually
explicit videos or pictures via any of eight named media platforms and how recent
was any such exposure?
Overall, 80.5% of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom said they had seen,
at least once, sexually explicit videos or pictures on at least one of the media plat-
forms listed in the survey4 (see Table 1 and Figure 1).
Among the large majority who had seen sexually explicit videos or pictures, their last
exposure was, on average, 5.5 days previously. However, this mean figure was raised
by a long tail of respondents whose last exposure was months ago. It was most
common for those 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom who had seen sexually
explicit videos or pictures to have seen them on the day they completed the survey: the
median number of days since their last exposure was ‘0’ (see Table 1 and Figure 1).
We compared5 those who had and had not, been exposed to sexually explicit videos
or pictures on any of the media platforms (see Table S2). The results showed statis-
tically significant differences between the genders, with females less likely to have been
exposed p( 1.02, 0.001β = − < ). There were also statistically significant differences
according to whether respondents knew about, or had used, a VPN or Tor browser. For
example, those who had used those technologies were more likely to have been ex-
posed than those who did not know what they were p( 0.86, 0.001β = < ). There were
no statistically significant differences in exposure between 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds or
between those of different social grades (see Table S2).
RQ2: Which media platforms do 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom use to view
pornographic videos or pictures and how recent is the use of each platform for this
purpose?
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As Table 1 and Figure 1 show, it is more likely for 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the
United Kingdom to have been exposed, at least once, to sexually explicit porn videos
or pictures via social media platforms (63%) or internet search engines (51%) than
via dedicated pornographic websites (47%). Conversely, respondents were less
likely to have seen pornography on television or DVDs, on messaging apps, or,
particularly, on YouTube or e‐mail and in magazines than on dedicated pornographic
websites.
However, although a greater proportion of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United
Kingdom had seen pornography on social media and internet search engines than on
dedicated pornographic websites, that exposure was, relative to dedicated porno-
graphic websites, less recent—most commonly 20 days ago. Among those who had
visited dedicated pornographic websites, their last visit was, on average, 13 days
previously. However, this mean figure has been elevated due to the number of re-
spondents whose last visit was up to 356 days ago. It was most common for 16‐ and
17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom to have visited a dedicated pornographic website
the day before they took the survey: the median number of days since the last visit
was 1 (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Television or DVDs, search engines, messaging
apps, e‐mail, and in particular YouTube and magazines, were relatively infrequently
used as sources of pornography (see Table 1 and Figure 1).
Our analysis5 (see Tables S2 and S3) showed statistically significant differences be-
tween the genders, with females less likely than males to have seen pornography on
dedicated pornographic websites p( 1.997, 0.001β = − < ), social media ( 0.504,β = −
p 0.001< ), search engines p( 1.223, 0.001β = − < ), YouTube p( 0.492, 0.01β = − < ),
messaging apps p( 0.523, 0.001β = − < ) and magazines p( 0.432, 0.05β = − < ),
although not on TV or DVDs and e‐mail.6 There were also statistically significant differ-
ences according to whether respondents knew about, or had used, VPNs or Tor brow-
sers. Household social grade made a significant difference to whether respondents had
seen pornography on dedicated pornographic websites and YouTube. In the case of
dedicated pornographic websites, respondents from households in social grade E were
significantly more likely to have been exposed than respondents from the most populous
social grade, C1 p( 0.74, 0.01β = < ). In the case of YouTube, respondents from
households of social grade B were significantly less likely to have been exposed than
those from households in the most populous social grade, C1 p( 0.489, 0.05β = − < ).
No differences were found between 16‐ and 17‐year olds.
We found7 no consistently significant differences between males and females, 16‐ and
17‐year‐olds, and respondents from households of different social grades in the recency
of their last exposure to pornography via all but one of the listed media platforms. In the
case of dedicated pornographic websites, females visited them significantly less fre-
quently than males (see Tables S4, S5, S7, and S8).
RQ3: How much time do 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom spend visiting
dedicated pornographic websites per month and how is that time split between PCs
and mobile devices (smartphones and tablets)?
The 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom who visit dedicated pornographic
websites say they do so for an average of 2 h 18min per month. That average is
raised by some who reported visiting for much longer. The most common—median—
amount of time spent on such sites was 1 h/month.
Our analysis8 (see Table S6) again showed statistically significant differences
between the genders, with females spending significantly less time with dedicated
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pornographic websites, 88.4 fewer minutes per month p( 88.4, 0.05)β = − < . Par-
ental social grade again also made a significant difference. For example, re-
spondents from households of social grade E spent significantly more time, 127.49
more minutes per month, than respondents from households of the most populous
social grade, C1 p( 127.49, 0.05)β = < .
Among those who accessed dedicated pornographic websites, the vast majority of
time (87% of the time) was spent accessing them via mobile devices, defined as
smartphones or tablet computers, rather than via PCs (13% of the time).
RQ4: What proportions of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom are aware of, or
have used, a VPN or Tor browser?
VPNs and Tor browsers enable users to mask their location and, it has been
claimed, may provide a means for users to circumvent country‐specific controls on
online pornography. Among 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom, 45.7% had
used a VPN or Tor browser, 22.9% knew what they were but had not used them, and
31.4% neither knew what they were or had used them.
DISCUSSION
This study's results add to the limited evidence that exists on the prevalence and predictors
of pornography use by adolescents in the United Kingdom. It confirms the BBFC's (2020,
p. 15) recent finding that around 80% of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds have been exposed to por-
nography at some point. In line with much of the other research (for a summary, see Peter &
Valkenburg, 2016), it also confirms that male adolescents are more likely to have been
exposed. We also find that respondents who had used a VPN or Tor browser were more
likely to have been exposed, echoing Ševčíková et al. (2014) finding that internet porno-
graphy use was higher among those with greater digital skills.
Our results may help to clear up some of the discrepancies that Horvath et al. (2013,
p. 22) note regarding the frequency with which young people are exposed to pornography.
Recent anecdotal evidence from the United Kingdom (BBFC, 2020, p. 20) had shown ex-
posure could be ‘daily’ for ‘most’ 16‐ to 18‐year‐old males. This observation is in line with our
own results that show that, among the 80.5% of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds who had seen por-
nography, it was most common (the median value) for their last exposure to have been
0 days ago, with the mean number of days since the last exposure 5.5.
As Nash et al. (2015) have noted, it is ‘surprisingly complicated’ to determine from the
literature the platforms through which children view pornography. Though such data has not
been a relevant variable for much previous research, it is highly relevant to the decisions
currently being made about the regulation of internet pornography as well as to any future
studies that may be carried out on the efficacy of such regulations. Our results confirm (see,
e.g., Horvath et al., 2013, p. 24) that the ways in which young people access pornography
have changed, with the internet playing a more dominant role. We found magazines were a
source for less than a quarter of 16‐and 17‐year‐olds in the United Kingdom and were used
very infrequently. Although TV and DVDs were a source for a higher proportion (38%), they
came some way behind dedicated pornographic websites (47%), search engines (51%), and
in particular social media sites (63%)—although they were on a par with internet messaging
services (39%) and ahead of YouTube (24%). That a significant majority of 16‐ and 17‐year‐
olds in the United Kingdom have come across pornography on social media sites suggests
the UK government was right to include such platforms in its latest proposals to reduce
children's exposure to legal online pornography.
14 | THURMAN AND OBSTER
This data on exposure needs though to be contextualised with reference to how fre-
quently such exposure takes place. Our study has shown that although a higher proportion
of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds had seen—at least once—pornography on social media sites than
on dedicated porn websites, dedicated porn websites were used much more frequently as a
source of pornography than social media sites. Among the 47% who had accessed dedi-
cated porn websites, most commonly (the median value) their last exposure was just 1 day
ago, with the mean number of days since last exposure 13 and the monthly visit time 2 h and
18mins. The frequency with which dedicated pornographic websites are used shows how
important such sites—the target of the United Kingdom's original age verification legislation
—are as a source of pornography for adolescents. The Online Harms White Paper proposes
to regulate companies that ‘allow users to share or discover user‐generated content or
interact with each other online’ (HM Government, 2019, p. 8). Though this encompasses
popular ‘porn‐tube’ sites, dedicated pornographic websites that only provide professionally
made content will not be covered. This exclusion is, in the view of Sarah Connolly, Director,
Security and Online Harms at the DCMS, not an issue for concern as she believes that
‘in practice, there are very few commercial pornography sites that don't include some ele-
ments of user‐generated content’ (personal communication, 23 June 2020). Rachel Bishop,
Deputy Director, Online Harms Policy at the DCMS agrees, adding that the few dedicated
pornographic websites that do not include user‐generated content present other barriers to
children, notably paywalls that require a credit card (personal communication, 9 July 2020).
Although the United Kingdom's original age verification legislation has not been enacted,
‘age verification technologies’ are still a tool the UK government expects companies may
use to ‘prevent children from accessing age‐inappropriate content’ (Gov.uk, 2020). This
study is the first to gather data on the proportion of 16‐ and 17‐year‐olds in the United
Kingdom who have actually used—rather than being simply aware of how to use—
workaround technologies, specifically VPNs and the Tor browser, that can be used to cir-
cumvent age verification controls. Our findings that 46% were already using these work-
around technologies and another 23% were aware of them add weight to concerns that
restrictions on the access to legal online pornography imposed by a single country may be
circumvented by those the checks are designed to protect.
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ENDNOTES
1The Market Research Society (MRS) is the United Kingdom's professional body for market researchers. They are
not related to YouthSight other than by accrediting them. To receive MRS accreditation, YouthSight have to ensure
that all their staff ‘understand their responsibilities under the MRS Code of Conduct and have the skills and
processes in place to fulfill them’. A variety of steps have to be taken to ensure such understanding, including
ensuring that the ‘MRS Code of Conduct is written into employee contracts or referred to in the company hand-
book’ (MRS, 2021).
2On the basis of data from the United Kingdom's Office for National Statistics.
3On the basis of National Readership Survey data on households' chief income earner.
4Dedicated pornographic websites, social media, internet search engines, TV or DVDs, messaging apps,
YouTube, e‐mail, and magazines.
5Using logistic regression.
6Because of the small proportion of respondents who had seen sexually explicit porn videos or pictures via e‐mail,
the results of our analysis of differences within the sample for this media platform should be interpreted with care.
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